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the confidentiality of the sources of civil tax and related law enforcement information. Such exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants.

(6)(f). Procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to existence of records pertaining to the individual dealing with an actual or potential criminal tax, civil tax, or regulatory investigation or prosecution must be exempted because such notice to an individual would be detrimental to the successful conduct and/or completion of an investigation or case, pending or future. In addition, mere notice of the fact of an investigation could inform the subject or others that their activities are under or may become the subject of an investigation and could enable the subjects to avoid detection, to influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.

Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act (Access to Records) the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records to the extent that this system of records is exempted from subsection (d).

(e) The following system of records is exempt from subsections (c)(3) and (d)(1) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5): Files of Applicants for Attorney and Non-Attorney Positions with the Tax Division, Justice/TAX-003. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in a record is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).

(f) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because an accounting could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a position with the Tax Division. Disclosure of an accounting could reveal the identity of a source of information and constitutes a breach of the promise of confidentiality by the Tax Division. This would result in the reduction in the free flow

of information vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications and suitability for federal employment.

(2) From subsection (d)(1) because disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Many persons are contacted who, without an assurance of anonymity, refuse to provide information concerning an applicant for a Tax Division position. Access could reveal the identity of the source of the information and constitute a breach of the promise of confidentiality on the part of the Tax Division. Such breaches ultimately would restrict the free flow of information vital to a determination of an applicant's qualifications and suitability.

[Order No. 742-77, 42 FR 40906, Aug. 12, 1977, as amended by Order No. 6-86, 51 FR 15478, Apr. 24, 1986; Order No. 003-2006, 71 FR 11309, Mar. 7, 2006]

### **§ 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems—limited access.**

(a) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g):

(1) Central Records System (CRS) (JUSTICE/FBI-002).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(j) and (k). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI.

(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2)(i) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern individual access to investigative records, compliance with which could compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security, interfere with the overall law enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety to law enforcement personnel.

(ii) Also, individual access to non-criminal investigative records, e.g., civil investigations and administrative inquiries, as described in subsection (k) of the Privacy Act, could also compromise classified information related to national security, interfere with a pending investigation or internal inquiry, constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, reveal a confidential source or sensitive investigative technique, or pose a potential threat to law enforcement personnel. In addition, disclosure of information collected pursuant to an employment suitability or similar inquiry could reveal the identity of a source who provided information under an express promise of confidentiality, or could compromise the objectivity or fairness of a testing or examination process.

(iii) In addition, from paragraph (d)(2) of this section, because to require the FBI to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, because of the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because:

(i) It is not possible in all instances to determine relevancy or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a criminal or other investigation.

(ii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing; what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed un-

necessary. It is only after the information is assessed that its relevancy and necessity in a specific investigative activity can be established.

(iii) In any investigation the FBI might obtain information concerning violations of law not under its jurisdiction, but in the interest of effective law enforcement, dissemination will be made to the agency charged with enforcing such law.

(iv) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, information could be obtained, the nature of which would leave in doubt its relevancy and necessity. Such information, however, could be relevant to another investigation or to an investigative activity under the jurisdiction of another agency.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the subject with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. In addition, because many of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint,

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foreign, tribal, and international agencies, it is administratively impossible to ensure compliance with this provision.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing investigative interest.

(c) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8), (f), (g) and (m):

(1) Electronic Surveillance (Elsur) Indices (JUSTICE/FBI-006).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j).

(d) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting disclosures would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g) because these provisions concern an individual's access to records which concern him and such access to records in this system would compromise ongoing investigations, reveal investigatory techniques and confidential informants, and invade the privacy of private citizens who provide information in connection with a particular investigation.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because these indices must be maintained in order to provide the information as described in the "routine uses" of this particular system.

(4) From subsections (e) (2) and (3) because compliance is not feasible given the subject matter of the indices.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because this provision is not applicable to the indices in view of the "routine uses" of the indices. For example, it is impossible to predict when it will be necessary to utilize information in the system and, accordingly it is not possible to determine when the records are timely.

(6) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirement could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures and the existence of confidential investigations.

(7) From subsection (m) for the reasons stated in subsection (b)(7) of this section.

(e) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e) (5) and (8), (f), and (g):

(1) Identification Division Records System (JUSTICE/FBI-009).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j).

(f) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for the reasons stated in subsection (d)(1) of this section.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (f) and (g) because these provisions concern an individual's access to records which concern him. Such access is directed at allowing the subject of a record to correct inaccuracies in it. Although an alternate system of access has been provided in 28 CFR 16.30 to 34 and 28 CFR 20.34, the vast majority of records in this system concern local arrests which it would be inappropriate for the FBI to undertake to correct.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty that all information on these records is relevant to accomplish a purpose of the FBI, even though acquisition of the records from state and local law enforcement agencies is based on a statutory requirement. In view of the number of records in the system it is impossible to review them for relevancy.

(4) From subsection (e)(2) because the records in the system are necessarily furnished by criminal justice agencies due to their very nature.

(5) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance is not feasible due to the nature of the records.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because the vast majority of these records come from local criminal justice agencies

and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision. Submitting agencies are, however, urged on a continuing basis to ensure that their records are accurate and include all dispositions.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the FBI has no logical manner to ascertain whether process has been made public and compliance with this provision would in any case, provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence.

(g) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g):

(1) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (JUSTICE/FBI-001). These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(3).

(h) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) for the reasons stated in subsection (d)(1) of this section.

(2) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g) for the reasons stated in subsection (d)(2) of this section. When records are properly subject to access by the individual, an alternate means of access is provided in subsection (i) of this section.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because information contained in this system is primarily from state and local records, and it is for the official use of agencies outside the Federal Government in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 534.

(4) From subsections (e) (2) and (3) because it is not feasible to comply with these provisions given the nature of this system.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed

by subsection (e)(5) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. In addition, the vast majority of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies and it is administratively impossible to ensure that the records comply with this provision. Submitting agencies are, however, urged on a continuing basis to ensure that their records are accurate and include all dispositions.

(6) From subsection (e)(8) for the reasons stated in subsection (d)(6) of this section.

(i) Access to computerized criminal history records in the National Crime Information Center is available to the individual who is the subject of the record pursuant to procedures and requirements specified in the Notice of Systems of Records compiled by the National Archives and Records Service and published under the designation:

(j) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), (f) and (g):

(1) National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) (JUSTICE/FBI-015).

These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) and (k)(2).

(k) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because providing the accounting of disclosures to the subject could prematurely reveal investigative interest by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, thereby providing the individual an opportunity to impede an active investigation, destroy or alter evidence, and possibly render harm to violent crime victims and/or witnesses.

(2) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (f) because disclosure to the subject could interfere with enforcement proceedings of a criminal justice agency, reveal the identity of a

confidential source, result in an unwarranted invasion of another's privacy, reveal the details of a sensitive investigative technique, or endanger the life and safety of law enforcement personnel, potential violent crime victims, and witnesses. Disclosure also could prevent the future apprehension of a violent or exceptionally dangerous criminal fugitive should he or she modify his or her method of operation in order to evade law enforcement. Also, specifically from subsection (d)(2), which permits an individual to request amendment of a record, because the nature of the information in the system is such that an individual criminal offender would frequently demand amendment of derogatory information, forcing the FBI to continuously retrograde its criminal investigations in an attempt to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(3) From subsection (g) because the system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to establish relevance and necessity of the information at the time it is obtained or developed. Information, the relevance and necessity of which may not be readily apparent, frequently can prove to be of investigative value at a later date and time.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would limit the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. In addition, because many of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and international agencies, it is administratively impossible to ensure compliance with this provision.

(1) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e) (1), (2), and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g).

(1) FBI Counterdrug Information Indices System (CIIS) (JUSTICE/FBI—016)

(2) [Reserved]

(m) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the thrust of the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent it is not applicable because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).

(3)(i) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these provisions concern individual access to records, compliance with which could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation, possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel.

(ii) In addition, from paragraph (d), because to require the FBI to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, because of the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(4)(i) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not possible in all instances to determine relevancy or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a criminal or other investigation.

(ii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing; what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed otherwise. It is only after the information is assessed that its relevancy and necessity in a specified investigative activity can be established.

(iii) In any investigation the FBI might obtain information concerning violations of law not under its jurisdiction, but in the interest of effective law enforcement, dissemination will be made to the agency charged with enforcing such law.

(iv) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, information could be obtained, the nature of which would leave in doubt its relevancy and necessity. Such information, however, could be relevant to another investigations or to an investigative activity under the jurisdiction of another agency.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other investigative activities is such that vital information about an individual often can only be obtained from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to principally rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the subject with information which could impede or compromise the investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the investigation or flee a specific area.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed

by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement.

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing investigative interest.

(9) From subsection (f) to the extent that this system is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).

(n) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c) (3) and (4); (d); (e) (1), (2), and 3; (e)(4) (G) and (H); (e) (5) and (8); and (g):

(1) National DNA Index System (NDIS) (JUSTICE/FBI-017).

(2) [Reserved]

(o) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available the accounting of disclosures of records to the subject of the record would prematurely place the subject on notice of the investigative interest of law enforcement agencies, provide the subject with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, or permit the subject to take measures to impede the investigation (e.g., destroy or alter evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid investigation and prosecution), and result in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2)(i) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H), and (g) because these provisions concern an individual's access to records which concern him/her and access to records in this system would compromise ongoing investigations. Such access is directed at allowing the subject of the record to correct inaccuracies in it. The vast majority of records in this system are from the DNA records of local and State NDIS agencies which would be inappropriate

and not feasible for the FBI to undertake to correct. Nevertheless, an alternate method to access and/or amend records in this system is available to an individual who is the subject of a record pursuant to procedures and requirements specified in the Notice of Systems of Records compiled by the National Archives and Records Administration and published in the FEDERAL REGISTER under the designation: National DNA Index System (NDIS) (JUSTICE/FBI-017)

(ii) In addition, from paragraph (d)(2) of this section, because to require the FBI to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant, or untimely, because of the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc.

(iii) In addition, from subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsection (e)(1) because:

(i) Information in this system is primarily from State and local records and it is for the official use of agencies outside the Federal Government.

(ii) It is not possible in all instances to determine the relevancy or necessity of specific information in the early stages of the criminal investigative process.

(iii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing; what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be deemed unnecessary, and vice versa. It is only after the information is assessed that its relevancy in a specific investigative activity can be established.

(iv) Although the investigative process could leave in doubt the relevancy and necessity of evidence which had been properly obtained, the same information could be relevant to another investigation or investigative activity under the jurisdiction of the FBI or another law enforcement agency.

(4) From subsections (e)(2) and (3) because it is not feasible to comply with these provisions given the nature of

this system. Most of the records in this system are necessarily furnished by State and local criminal justice agencies and not by individuals due to the very nature of the records and the system.

(5) From subsection (e)(5) because the vast majority of these records come from State and local criminal justice agencies and because it is administratively impossible for them and the FBI to insure that the records comply with this provision. Submitting agencies are urged and make every effort to insure records are accurate and complete; however, since it is not possible to predict when information in the indexes of the system (whether submitted by State and local criminal justice agencies or generated by the FBI) will be matched with other information, it is not possible to determine when most of them are relevant or timely.

(6) From subsection (e)(8) because the FBI has no logical manner to determine whenever process has been made public and compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with ongoing investigations.

(p) The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), (JUSTICE/FBI-018), a Privacy Act system of records, is exempt:

(1) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), from subsections (c) (3) and (4); (d); (e) (1), (2) and (3); (e)(4) (G) and (H); (e) (5) and (8); and (g); and

(2) Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k) (2) and (3), from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (e)(4) (G) and (H).

(q) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(2), and (k)(3). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the accounting of disclosures would place the subject on notice that the subject is or has been the subject of investigation and result in a serious impediment to law enforcement.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent that it is not applicable since an exemption is claimed from subsection (d).

(3)(i) From subsections (d) and (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these provisions concern an individual's access to records which concern the individual and such access to records in the system would compromise ongoing investigations, reveal investigatory techniques and confidential informants, invade the privacy of persons who provide information in connection with a particular investigation, or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel.

(ii) In addition, from subsection (d)(2) because, to require the FBI to amend information thought to be not accurate, timely, relevant, and complete, because of the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative burden by forcing the agency to continuously update its investigations attempting to resolve these issues.

(iii) Although the Attorney General is exempting this system from subsections (d) and (e)(4) (G) and (H), an alternate method of access and correction has been provided in 28 CFR, part 25, subpart A.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty that all information in these records is relevant to accomplish a purpose of the FBI, even though acquisition of the records from state and local law enforcement agencies is based on a statutory requirement. In view of the number of records in the system, it is impossible to review them for relevancy.

(5) From subsections (e) (2) and (3) because the purpose of the system is to verify information about an individual. It would not be realistic to rely on information provided by the individual. In addition, much of the information contained in or checked by this system is from Federal, State, and local criminal history records.

(6) From subsection (e)(5) because it is impossible to predict when it will be necessary to use the information in the system, and, accordingly, it is not possible to determine in advance when the records will be timely. Since most of the records are from State and local or other Federal agency records, it would be impossible to review all of them to

verify that they are accurate. In addition, an alternate procedure is being established in 28 CFR, part 25, subpart A, so the records can be amended if found to be incorrect.

(7) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirement could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques and confidential investigations.

(8) From subsection (g) to the extent that, pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(2), and (k)(3), the system is exempted from the other subsections listed in paragraph (p) of this section.

(r) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8); and (g):

(1) Terrorist Screening Records System (TSRS) (JUSTICE/FBI-019).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the counterterrorism purposes of this system, and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.

(8) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, *e.g.*, destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid or impede the investigation. Similarly, disclosing this information to individuals who have been misidentified as known or suspected terrorists due to a close name similarity could reveal the Government's investigative interest in a terrorist suspect, because it could



make known the name of the individual who actually is the subject of the Government's interest. Consequently, the Government has as great an interest in protecting the confidentiality of identifying information of misidentified persons as it does in protecting the confidentiality of the identities of known or suspected terrorists.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of records contained in this system, which consists of counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of a terrorism investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the FBI and/or other intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information classified in the interest of national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised. Similarly, compliance with these provisions with respect to records on individuals who have been misidentified as known or suspected terrorists due to a close name similarity could reveal the Government's investigative interest in a terrorist suspect, because it could make known the name of the individual who actu-

ally is the subject of the Government's interest.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for TSC to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between the individual being screened and a known or suspected terrorist. Also, because TSC and the FBI may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.

(6) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require TSC to provide notice to an individual if TSC receives information about that individual from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(7) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for the FBI and the TSC to vouch for their compliance with this provision; however, the TSC has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, TSC supports but does not

conduct investigations; therefore, it must be able to collect information related to terrorist identities and encounters for distribution to law enforcement and intelligence agencies that do conduct terrorism investigations. In the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. The TSC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. The FBI also is exempting the TSRS from the requirements of subsection (e)(5) in order to prevent the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the TSRS. The FBI has exempted TSRS records from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of counterterrorism investigations. Exempting the TSRS from subsection (e)(5) serves to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record's accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and the TSC and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

(t) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act:

(1) Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEX), (JUSTICE/FBI-020).

(2) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of this system, or the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemption may be waived by the FBI in its sole discretion.

(u) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). Also, because making available to a record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in the individual. Revealing this information may thus compromise ongoing law enforcement efforts. Revealing this information may also permit the record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, such as destroying evidence, intimidating potential witnesses or fleeing the area to avoid the investigation.

(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).

(3) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of investigatory records, compliance with which could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health

or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing investigations and other law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.

(4) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to know in advance what information is relevant and necessary for law enforcement purposes and, in fact, a major tenet of the N-DEx information sharing system is that the relevance of certain information may not always be evident in the absence of the ability to correlate that information with other existing law enforcement data.

(5) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to efforts to solve crimes and improve homeland security in that it would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.

(6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would put the subject of an investigation on notice of that fact and would permit the subject to engage in conduct intended to thwart that activity.

(7)(i) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system are records contributed by other agencies and the restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the utility of the N-DEx system. All data contributors are expected to ensure that information they share is relevant, timely, complete and accurate. In fact, rules for use of the N-DEx system will require that information be updated periodically and not be used as a basis for action or disseminated beyond the recipient without the recipient first obtaining permission from the record owner/contributor. These rules will be enforced through robust audit procedures. The existence of these rules should ameliorate any perceived concerns about the integrity of the information in the N-DEx system. Nevertheless, exemption from this provision is warranted in order to reduce the administrative burden on the FBI to vouch for compliance with the

provision by all N-DEx data contributors and to encourage those contributors to share information the significance of which may only become apparent when combined with other information in the N-DEx system.

(ii) The FBI is also exempting the N-DEx from subsection (e)(5) in order to block the use of a challenge under subsection (e)(5) as a collateral means to obtain access to records in the N-DEx. The FBI has exempted these records from the access and amendment requirements of subsection (d) of the Privacy Act in order to protect the integrity of law enforcement investigations. Exempting the N-DEx system from subsection (e)(5) complements this exemption and will provide the FBI with the ability to prevent the assertion of challenges to a record's accuracy, timeliness, completeness and/or relevance under subsection (e)(5) to circumvent the exemption claimed from subsection (d).

(8) From subsection (e)(8), because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on the FBI and may alert the subjects of law enforcement investigations to the fact of those investigations, when not previously known.

(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

[Order No. 40-80, 45 FR 5301, Jan. 23, 1980]

EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER citations affecting § 16.96, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and on GPO Access.

#### **§ 16.97 Exemption of Bureau of Prisons Systems—limited access.**

(a) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (2) and (3), (e)(4) (H), (e)(8), (f) and (g):

(1) Custodial and Security Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-001).

(2) Industrial Inmate Employment Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-003).

(3) Inmate Administrative Remedy Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-004).

(4) Inmate Central Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-005).